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BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME
Paul C. Giannelli
Albert J. Weatherhead Ill & Richard IN. Weatherhead
Professor of Law, Case Western ReseNe University
The battered woman syndrome (BWS) describes a
pattern of violence inflicted on a woman by her mate. In
1979, Dr. Lenore Walker, one of the principal researchers
in this field, published her seminal text, The Battered
Woman. She described a battered woman as follows:
A battered woman is a woman who is repeatedly
subjected to any forceful physical or psychological
1,,
behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without any concern for her
rights. Battered women include wives or women in any
form of intimate relationships with men. Furthermore,
in order to be classified as a battered woman, the
couple must go through the battering cycle at least
twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time,
and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a
·(~i battered woman. L. Walker, The Battered Woman xv
(1979)
Dr. Walker's initial findings were based on a nonrandom
sample of 110 battered women who were mostly white
and middle-class. A later study, published in her second
book, involved a more representative sample of435
women. In the second book, Walker defined the
' syndrome by incidents of violence. "A battered woman is
a woman ... who is or has been in an intimate relationship with a man who repeatedly subjects or subjected
i her to forceful physical and/or psychological abuse." Two
acute battering incidents qualified as "repeated" incidents.
L. Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome 203 (1984).
1
See also L. Walker, Terrifying Love: Why Battered Women
Kill and How Society Responds (1989).

CYCLE OF VIOLENCE
The violence associated with this type of relationship is
neither constant nor random. Instead, it follows a pattern.
Dr. Walker identified a three-stage cycle of violence. L.
Walker, The Battered Woman at 55-70.
The first stage is the "tension building" phase; during
, which small abusive episodes occur. These episodes
gradually escalate over a period of time.
The tension continues to build until the second stage
i. -the acute battering phase- erupts. During this

!
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phase, in which most injuries occur, the battering is out of
control. Psychological abuse in the form of threats of
future harm is also prevalent.
The third phase is a calm, loving period during which
the batterer is contrite, seeks forgiveness, and promises
to refrain from future violence. This phase provides a
positive reinforcement for the woman to continue the
relationship in the hope that the violent behavior will not
recur. The cycle then repeats itself.
In addition, the batterer is often extremely jealous of
the spouse's time and attention, a factor that further
isolates-her from friends and outside support. Note,
"Self-Defense: Battered Woman Syndrome on Trial," 20
Cal. W. L. Rev. 485, 487 (1984). Moreover, numerous
obstacles, both psychological and economic, often
prevent the battered spouse from leaving her mate.
Walker used Martin Seligman's theory of "learned helplessness" to explain the woman's condition. L. Walker,
The Battered Woman at 43-54.
In sum, the battered woman feels "trapped in a deadly
situation." Walker, Thyfault & Browne, "Beyond the Juror's
Ken: Battered Women," 7 Vermont L. Rev. 1, 12 (1982).
Caught in this cycle, she sometimes strikes back and kills.
CRITICISMS
The evidentiary use of the BWS is not without its critics.
In 1986, Professor Faigman questioned the validity of the
underlying research:
The prevailing theories of battered woman syndrome
have little evidentiary value in self-defense cases. The
work of Lenore Walker, the leading researcher on
battered woman syndrome, is unsound and largely
irrelevant to the central issues in such cases. The
Walker cycle theory suffers from significant methodelogical and interpretative flaws that render it incapable
of explaining why an abused woman strikes out at her
mate when she does. Similarly, Walker's application of
-learned helplessness to the situation of battered
women does not account for the actual behavior of
many women who remain in battering relationships.
Faigman, 'The Battered Woman Syndrome and SelfDefense: A Legal and Empirical Dissent," 72 Va. L.
Rev. 619, 647 (1986).
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thg ca§es involve confrontations. Maguigan, "Battered
Women and Self:Defense: MYths arid Misconceptions in
Current Reform Proposals," 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 379, 397
(1991) (surveying appellate decisions). The second
assumption is that traditional self-defense law excluded a ~f
female perspective. The author argues that while it is
true that self-defense law developed in cases with male
defendants, it is not true that the law ignored "the context
of a battered woman's actions." /d. at 405.

Faigman, however, does-argue that "courts should allow
juries to consider valid social science research and the
battered woman's own history of abuse in evaluating her
self-defense claim." /d. at 622.
Another critic wrote: "Reduced to its essence,
battered-woman syndrome is not a physicians' diagnosis
but an advocate's invention. It means: Blame the
deceased." Caplan, "Battered Wives, Battered Justice,"
National Review 39, 40 (Feb. 1991).
A 1992 revieW of the research literature, however,
indicates that BWS now has attained, to a large extent,
scientific acceptance. Citing a survey of experts in the
field, Schuller and Vidmar conclude:

ADMISSIBILITY: SELF-DEFENSE
The Cl.c!r:Tli.~§j!;>j!Lty~Qf E!X:pert testimony on BWS has
produced much commentary and initially divided the
courts. It was first introduced in the 1979 case of lbnTamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634-35 (D.C. 1979),
aff'd on appeal after remand, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983).
Several different evidentiary issues are raised.

The degree of expert consensus shown in the
Dodge and Greene survey tends to suggest that the
scientific literature bearing on a battered woman's
circumstances and situation is sound. There are,
however, some aspects of the testimony- the cycle
pattern of violence and. the development of learned
helplessness -that are not universal across battering
relationships. Schuller & Vidmar, "Battered Woman
Syndrome Evidence in the Courtroom: A Review of the
Literature," 16 Law & Hum. Behav. 273, 281 (1992)
(citing Dodge & Greene, ·~urors and Expert Conceptions
of Battered Women," 6 Victims & Violence 271 (1991)
(18-item survey of45 professionals who have published
in the field)).
[1

H

il

IiII
I.:

!J
}

!

Relevancy · .·
The first issue concerns the relevancy of BWS
evidence. Typically, the evidence is offered in support of
a self-defense claim in a homicide prosecution. A few
courts have declared that BWS evidenc·e is simply irrele-vant to a self-d~fense claim. See People v. White, 90 Ill.
App. 3d 1067, 1072-73, 414 N.E.2d 196, 200-01 (1980);
State v. Necaise, 466-So. 2d 660, 663-65 (La. App. 1985);
State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518,521, 423 N.E.2d 137,
140 (1981), overruled by State v. Koss, 49 Ohio St. 3d 213,
551 N.E.2d 970, 974 (1990).
This see·mswrong. While being a battered woman by
itself is no defense to homicide, the syndrome may
explain two elements of aself-defense claim: (1) the
defendant's subjective fear of serious injury or death and
(2) the reasonableness of that beliet See generally W.
LaFave & AcScott,Criminal Law§5.7(2ded. 1984); 2 P.
Robinson, Criminal Law Defenses§ 132 (1984).
Numerous courts have recognized the relevancy of
BWS evidence for this purpose. E.g., People v. Aris, 215
Cal. App. 3d 1178, 1196-99,264 Cai.Rptr. 167, 179-81
(1989); Terry v. State, 467 So. 2d 761, 763-64 (Fla. App.
1985); Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801, 806-07 (Fla.
App. 1982); State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. 461, 467-69, 693
P.2d 475,_ 479~8.0 (1985); State v. Anaya, 438 A.2d 892,
894 (Me. 1981); State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 202-05, 478
A.2d 364, 375~77-(1984); People v; Torres, 128 Misc.2d
129, 133-34,488 N.Y.S.2d 358,362 (N.Y. Sup. 1985); State
v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811,820 (N.D. 1983). See a/so
May v. State, 460 So. 2d 778, 785 (Miss. 1984) ('[T]he
battered wife syndrome has important informational and
explanatory power .. ,").
For example, the evidence explains why a battered
woman has not left her mate. According to the New
Jersey Supreme Court, "[o]nly by understanding these
unique pressures that force battered women to remain
with their mates, despite their long-standing and
reasonable fear of severe bodily harm and the isolation
that being a battered woman creates, can a battered
woman's state of mind be accurately and fairly understood." State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 196, 478 A.2d 364, 372
(1984). See a/so Fielder v. State, 756 S.W.2d 309, 319
(Tex. Crim. App. 1988).
Another court admitted BWS evidence to help explain
a battered woman's conduct after killing her mate. People

The widespread legal acceptance of BWS is a product
of the work of feminist scholars, who have attacked the
traditional law of self-defense as based upon a maleoriented perspective. Such scholarship, however, also
recognizes tha:t the BWSmay perpetuate stereotypes:
"Dweliingstere·orypes are lil<elyto become the focus of
the trial process. While the prosecution attempts to
discredit the defendanHomot"livingup to the standard of
a 'good woman', the defense counters with an equally
distorted portrayal of the defendant as ultra-feminine: a
passive, helpless victim." Jenkins & Davidson, "Battered
Women in the Criminal Justice System: An Analysis of
Gender Stereotypes," 8 Behav. Sci. & Law 161, 169 (1990).
See a/so Crocker, "The Meaning of Equality for
Battered Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense," 8 Harv.
Women's L. J. 121, (1985) ("She is held liable for having
lived as a woman, and she is held responsible for having
reacted, even if only once, as a man"); S~hneider,
"Describing and Changing: Womem'sSelf-Defense Work
and the Problem of ,Exp~l1 Te§tim9nY pn Battering," 9
Women's Rts. L. Rptr. 195, 216-17 (1986) ("Yet, to the
degree that the explanation is perceived to focus on her
suffering from a 'syndrome,' a term which suggests a loss
of control and passivity, the testimony seems to be inconsistent with the notion of reasonableness ..."); Mahoney,
"Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue
of Separation," 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1991) ("Yet the expert
testimony on battered woman syndrome and learned
helplessness can interact with and perpetuate existing
oppressive stereotypes of battered woman.").
Another author suggests, however, that most proposals
for law reform concerning this subject are based on two
assumptions, both of which are wrong. The first assumption is that a majority of cases involve non confrontational
situations (e.g., spouse asleep or hired killer); however, a
survey of the cases reveals that approximately 75% of
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the cases involve confrontations. Maguigan, "Battered
warfi·ena'nCi"seli:befense: MYths and-Misconceptions i
CurrentReform Proposals," 140 U. Pa. L. Rev. 379, 397
(1991) (surveying appellate decisions). The second
assumption is that traditional self-defense law excludec
female perspective. The author argues that while it is
true that self"defense law developed in cases with male
defendants, it is not true that the law ignored "the conte
of a baUered woman's actions." /d. at 405.

Faigman~ however, does argue that' 'courts should allow

juries to consider valid social science research and the
battered woman's own history of abuse in evaluating her
seff~defense claim." /d. at 622.
Another critic wrote: "Reduced to its essence,
battered-woman syndrome is not a physicians' diagnosis
but an advocate's invention. It means: Blame the
deceased.'' Caplan, "Battered Wives, Battered Justice,"
National Review 39, 40 (Feb. 1991).
A 1992 revieW of the research literature, however,
indicates that BWS now has attained, to a large extent,
scientific acceptance. Citing a survey of experts in the
field, Scnullerand Vidmar conclude:

ADMISSIBILITY: SElF-DEFENSE
Iheadmissibility of expert testimony on BWS has
produced rriiich commentary and initially divided the
courts. It was first introduced in the 1979 case of lbnTamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634-35 (D.C. 197!
aff'd on appeal after remand, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983).
Several different evidentiary issues are raised.

Th~degree of expert consensus shown in the
Dodge and Greene survey tends to suggest that the
scientifid.fiterature bearing on a battered woman's
circum'i.tanbes and situation is sound. There are,
however, some aspects of the testimony- the cycle
pattern of violence and the development of learned
helplessn~ss- that are not universal across battering
relationships. Schuller & Vidmar, "Battered Woman
Syndrome Evidence in the Courtroom: A Review of the
Literature," 16 Law & Hum. Behav. 273, 281 (1992)
(citing Dodge & Greene, ':Jurors and Expert Conceptions
ofBaUer~d Women," 6 Victims & Violenc~ 271 (1991)
(18-ifemsurvey of 45 professionals who have published
in the field)).

Relevancy
_
The firstissue concerns the relevancy of BWS
evidence. Typically, the evidence is offered in support c
a self-defense claim in a homicide prosecution. A few
courts have declared that BWS evidenc·e is simply irrel
vantto aself-defense claim. See People v.White, 90 Ill
App. 3d1067, 1072-73,414 N.E.2d 196,200-01 (1980);
State v. Necaise, 466-So. 2d 660, 663,65 (La. App. 198!
State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518, 521, 423 N.E.2d 1
140 (1981), overruled by Statev. Koss, 49 Ohio St. 3d 2
551 N.E.2d970, 974 (1990).
This see·mswrong. While. being a battered woman b
itself is no defense to homicide, the syndrome may
explaintwoelements of aself"defense claim: (1) the
defendant's subjective fear of serious injury or death a
(2) the reasonableness of that belief. See generally W.
LaFay€),~ Ac·":Scott, Criminal Law-.§ 5,7- (2d.ed.1984); 2
Robinson; Criminal Law Defenses§ 1~2 (1984).
Numerous courts have recognized the relevancy of
BWS evidence for this purpose. E.g., People v. Aris, 21
Cal. App. 3d 1178, 1196-99, 264 CaL Rptr. 167, 179-81
(1989); Terry v. State, 467 So. 2d 761, 763-64 (Fla. App.
1985); Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801, 806-07 (Fia
App. 1982); State v. Hundley, 236 Kan. 461, 467-69, 69:
P.2d~l75,_ 47~"80 (1985); State v. Anaya; 438 A.2d 892,
894 (Me;J91l1);StatE! v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178,202-05, 478
A.2d 364; 375-77 (1984); PeopJev; Torres, 128 Misc.2d
129, 133-34,488 N.Y.S.2d 358,362 (N.Y. Sup. 1985); S1
v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811,820 (N.D. 1983). See a/sc
May v. State, 460 So. 2d 778, 785 (Miss. 1984) ('[T]he
battered wife syndrome has important informational a1
explanatory power ...").
For example, the evidence explains why a battered
woman has not left her mate. According to the New
Jersey Supreme Court, "[o]nly by understanding thes
unique pressures that force baUered women to rem air
with theirmates, despite theirJong-standing and
reasonable fear of severe bodily harm and the isolatio
that being a battered woman creates, can a battered
woman's state of mind be accurately and fairly understood." State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 196,478 A.2d 364, 3
(1984). See a/so Fielder v. State, 756 S.W.2d 309, 319
(Tex. Grim. App. 1988).
Another court admitted BWS evidence to help explc
a battered woman's conduct after killing her mate. Pe<

The widespread legal acceptance of BWS is a product
of the wo·rkof feminist scholars, who have attacked the
traditional law of self-defense as based upon a maleoriented perspective. Such scholarship, however, also
recognizestnat the BWS may perpetuate stereotypes:
· "Dwelling· stereotypes are likely to become the focus of
the trial. process. While the prosecution attempts to
discretlitth·edefendantfomotliving up to the standard of
a 'gooa Woman', the defense counters with an equally
distorte(fportrayal of the defendant as ultra-feminine: a
passive, helpless victim." Jenkins & Davidson, "BaUered
Women in the Criminal Justice System: An Analysis of
Gender Stereotypes," 8 Behav. Sci. & Law 161, 169 (1990).
See also Crocker, "The Meaning of Equality for
BaUeredWomen Who Kill Men in Self-Defense," 8 Harv.
Warnell's L J. 121, (1985) ("She is held liable for having
lived asavyoman, and she is held responsible for having
reac;teg, e,§Em if only once, as a man"); Schneider,
"bescri~ing and Changing: Women's Self-Defense Work
andt!Ji.J~rPj:!l~m qf Expert Testimony on Battering," 9
Won'refl~s-Rt$.L. Rpfr. 195, 216-17 (1986) ("Yet, tothe
degree-thatthe explanation is perceived to focus on her
sufferir)gfri:im a 'syndrome,' a term which suggests a loss
ofcO'nTrorana passivity, the testimony seems to be inconsistent 'A/!th the notion of reasonableness ..."); Mahoney,
"Legallmages of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue
of Separation," 90 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1991) ("Yet the expert
testimony.on battered woman syndrome and learned
helplessness can interact with and perpetuate existing
oppressive stereotypes of battered woman.").
Another author suggests, however, that most proposals
for law reform concerning this subject are based on two
assumptions, both of which are wrong. The first assumption is that a majority of cases involve nonconfrontational
situations (e.g., spouse asleep or hired killer); however, a
survey of the cases reveals that approximately 75% of
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v. Minnis, 118111. App. 3d 345,356-57,455 N.E.2d 209,
218 (1983) (BWS "might extend to [explain] dismemberment" of husband after killing, a point which the prosecution legitimately exploited.)
Similarly, this evidence also would be admissible on
the subjective fear element in a jurisdiction that recognized "imperfect self-defense," which reduces murder to
voluntary manslaughter. See People v. Aris, 215 Cal. App.
3d 1178, 1199, 264 Cal. Rptr. 167, 181 (1989) (BWS
evidence is relevant "to prove the honest belief requirement for both perfect and imperfect self-defense"); Note,
"Partially Determined Imperfect Self-Defense: The Battered
Wife Kills and Tells Why," 34 Stan. L. Rev. 615 (1982).
Battered Child Defense
In Statev. Janes, 64 Wash. App. 134, 822 P.2d 1238
(1992), rev. granted, 119 Wash. 2d 1001, 832 P.2d 488
(1992), these arguments were applied to a "battered
child." The court reasoned that "[n]either law nor logic
suggests any reason to limit to women recognition of the
impact a battering relationship may have on the victim's
actions or perceptions ... [C]hildren are both objectively
and subjectively more vulnerable to ... violence than are
adults." /d. at 142, 822 P.2d at 1243.
Other courts have rejected this view, at least in
nonconfrontational situations. See Whipple v. Duckworth, 957 F.2d 418, 421-24 (7th Cir. 1992) (exclusion of
syndrome evidence did not violate constitution because
accused offered no evidence that he was in immediate
danger), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 218 (1992); Jahnke v.
State, 682 P.2d 991, 1008 (Wyo. 1984) ("battered son"
testimony rejected because the defendant was not under
attack at the time of the killing).
See generally P. Mones, When a Child Kills: Abused
Children Who Kill Their Parents (1991); Van Sambeek,
"Parricide as Self-defense," 7 Law & Inequality 87
(1988-89); Comment, "Killing Daddy: Developing a SelfDefense Strategy for the Abused Child," 137 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1281 (1989).

'
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of wife abuse and that some jurors are likely to be more
misinformed than others. Nevertheless, the surveys have
not found overwhelming endorsement of the 'myths'
about abuse." Schuller & Vidmar, "Battered Woman
Syndrome Evidence in the Courtroom: A Review of the
Literature," 16 Law & Hum. Behav. 273, 283 (1992).
Scientific Basis
A final issue relates to the scientific basis for BWS
evidence. Some courts excluded expert testimony on this
subject because its scientific validity had not been sufficiently established. lbn-Tamas v. United States, 455 A.2d
893, 983-94 (D.C. 1983); State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d
518, 521-22, 423 N.E.2d.137, 140 (1981) (BWS not sufficiently developed as scientific knowledge), overruled by
State v. Koss, 49 Ohio St. 3d 213, 551 N.E.2d 970,974
(1990); Buhrle v. State, 627 P.2d 1374, 1378 (Wyo. 1981)
(record did not establish scientific basis).
Rejecting this argument, other courts have concluded
that a "sufficient scientific basis" has been established.
State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 211,478 A.2d 364, 380 (1984).
According to a federal district court, "[t]he general
acceptance of expert testimony on the battered woman
syndrome has been acknowledged by legal authorities
as well as the scientific community." Fennell v. Goolsby,
630 F. Supp. 451, 459 (E. D. Pa. 1985). Accord State v.
Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793, 797-99 (Minn. 1989); State v.
Gallegos, 104 N.M. 247, 253, 719 P.2d 1268,1274 (N.M.
App. 1986).
As noted earlier, the research now supports the latter
cases.
Recent Trend
The trend in the cases is to admit BWS evidence. See
Note, "A Trend Emerges: A State Survey on the Admissibility of Expert Testimony Concerning the Battered
Woman Syndrome," 25 J. Fam. L. 373, 396 (1986-87)
("The trend ... appears to be in the direction of admissibility ..."); An not., "Admissibility of Expert or Opinion
Testimony on Battered Wife or Battered Woman
Syndrome," 1B A.L.R.4th 1153 (1982).
For example, the Ohio Supreme Court has reversed its
earlier position and admitted BWS evidence. State v.
Koss, 49 Ohio St. 3d 213, 217, 551 N.E.2d 970, 974 (1990).
Two states, including Ohio, have enacted statutes admitting BWS evidence. See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 563.033 (1992
Supp.); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.§§ 2901.06,2945.39,
2945.392 (Baldwin 1992). See also State v. Williams, 787
S.W.2d 308,311-12 (Mo. App. 1990) (statute applies to
unmarried as well as married victims).
Nevertheless, one court has held that the refusal to
admit BWS evidence is not unconstitutional. Tourlakis v.
Morris, 738 F. Supp. 1128, 1140 (S.D. Ohio 1990).

Beyond Jurors Knowledge
A second issue is whether BWS evidence is a proper
subject for expert testimony. In 1981, the Ohio Supreme
Court held that this subject is "within the understanding
of the jury" and thus inappropriate for expert testimony.
State v. Thomas, 66 Ohio St. 2d 518,521, 423 N.E.2d 137,
140 (1981), overruled by State v. Koss, 49 Ohio St.3d 213,
551 N.E.2d 970 (1990).
Most courts disagree, finding that "a battering relationship embodies psychological and societal features that
are not well understood by lay observers." State v. Kelly,
97 N.J. 178,209, 478 A.2d 364, 379 (1984). Accord Ibnlamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626, 634-35 (D.C. 1979),
appeal after remand, 455 A.2d 893 (D.C. 1983);
Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801, 806 (Fla. App.),
appeal dismissed, 415 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1982); Smith v.
State, 247 Ga. 612, 618-19, 277 S.E.2d 678, 683 (1981);
People v. Torres, 128 Misc. 2d 129, 134, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358,
362 (Sup. Ct. 1985); State v. Hill, 287 S.C. 398, 399, 339
S.E.2d 121, 122 (1986); State v. Allery, 101 Wash. 2d 591,
597, 682 P.2d 312, 316 (1984).
The research appears to support this conclusion; it
"suggests that jurors are misinformed on some aspects

limitations on Admissjbility
Several limitations on admissibility should be noted.
First, some courts permit experts to explain the
syndrome only in general terms, describing the salient
characteristics of BWS. Accordingly, the expert "should
not be allowed to testify as to the ultimate fact that the
particular defendant actually suffers from battered
woman syndrome." State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793,
799 (Minn. 1989).
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--$ecqnd; the-substantive .. law.ofselt~defense may limit
admissibility. Traditional self~defense law requires "imminent" danger of death or serious bodily injury. Typically, a
kllfing irdne absellce of a confrontation falls outside this
rule. Accordingly, several courts have held that a battered
wife who kills a sleeping spouse cannot claim selfdefense. Eg., Statev. Stewart, 243 Kan. 639, 647-48, 763 ·
P.2d 572, 577-78 (1988); State v. Norman, 324 N.C. 253,
261-68, 378 S.E.2d 8, 13-16 (1989). See generally
Comment, "Rendering Each Woman Her Due: Can a
Battered Woman Claim Self-Defense When She Kills Her
Sleeping Batterer?," 38 U. Kan. L. Rev. 169 (1989).
_§irriilai"[Y,sorne courts refuse to recognize the use of
BW$ evidence in "rnurder-for-hire'~ cases. E.g., People v.
Yakfich, 833 B2d 7sB, 1~0 (Colo. App. 1991); State v.
Martin;66s:s.w:~a 895, ~99-900(I\J1o,.App. 1984). The
opposil)g view is that the battered woman may justifiably
believe she is in "imminent" danger even though she is
not being beaten or threatened at the time of the killing.
f3ecause ofthis problem, one commentator has
argliedJI:IattheJegal definitici.tl ot~«W:defense is too
restrictive and should be modified to recognize "psychological self-defense." Ewing, "Psychological SelfDefense: A Proposed Justification for Battered Women
Who Kill," 14 Law & Hum. Behav. 579 (1990). Others,
however, have criticized this proposal: "The psychological justification for the defense employs unacceptably
soft science, and its legal support is confused and
regressive." Morse, "The Misbegotten Marriage of Soft
Psychology and Bad Law: Psychological Self-Defense as
a Justification for Homicide," 14 Law & Hum. Behav. 595,
595-96 (1990).
See a/so Greenwald, Tomkins, Kenning & Zavodny,
"PsycfiOiogicarSelf:Defense Jury Instructions: Influence
on Verdicts for Battered Women Defendants," 8 Behav.
ScL&'Law 171(1990).
ADMISSIBILITY: OTHER CASES
BWS evidence has been offered for purposes other
than self-defense. In most of these cases the syndrome
is used by the prosecution rather thanJhe defense.
lnArcoren v. United States, 929 F.2d 1235 (8th Cir.
1991); cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 312 (1991), the defendant
was charged with aggravated sexual abuse. His estranged wife reported the assault but theh recanted her
grand jury.testimony.at trial. The prosecution introduced
t:3W$.evlc:leru;e.tqe~plfi.Jnthewife'sconduct. On appeal
the Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding ''no persuasive
reason" to limit BWS testimony "to cases in which it is
offered to bolster a claim of self-defense." /d. at 1241.
··other cases have reached a similar result. In State v.
Bl:lker, 120N.H. 773, 775-76,424 A.2d 171, 172-73 (1980),
the court upheld the introduction of BWS evidence to
rebut an insanity defense in the trial of a husband for the
attempted murder of his wife.
In State v. Ciskie, 110 Wash. 2d 263, 281, 751 P.2d 1165,
1170-71 (1988), BWS evidence was admitted in a rape
prosecution to explain why the victim had not left the
defendant or reported the abuse.
As one court has noted: "It would seem anomalous to
allow a battered woman, where she is a criminal defendant, to offer this type of expert testimony in order to help
the jury understand the actions she took, yet deny her

thatsame_Qpportunityw_he_n §D§ is th(3 complaining
witness and/or victim and her abuser is the criminal
defendant.'' State v. Frost, 242 N.J. Super. 601, 612, 577
A.2d 1-282, 1287 (A.D.), cert. denied, 127 N.J. 321, 604
A.2d 596 (1990). See generally Note, "Using Battered
Woman Syndrome Evidence in the Prosecution of a
Batterer," 76 Iowa L. Rev. 553 (1991) (offering prosecutors
guidelines for the introduction of BWS evidence).
BWS evidence has also beem introduced in sentencing
proceedings. E.g., United States v. Johnson, 956 F.2d
894, 901-02 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Whitetail, 956
F.2d 857, 864 (8th Cir. 1992) (Sentencing guidelines
"permitconsideration otl:>atl~J.ecl~Y'{Qr:n_c:m syndrome as a
basis for departure from the guidelines.")

RELATED ISSUES
Several other issues concerning the battered wife
syndrome. have arisen. One court has ruled it error for
the prosecution to rebut BWS evidence with evidence of
the defendant's prior aggressive acts toward the victim.
State Kelly, 102 Wash. 2d 188; 193~99, 685 P.2d 564,
569-71 (1984). This type of rebuttal evidence is inadmissi·
ble because it is character evidence.

v.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Several cases raise claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. In one case the Sixth Circuit ruled that a
defense counsel's failure to introduce expert testimony
on the battered woman syndrome did not constitute
ineffective assistance. Meeks v. Bergen, 749 F.2d 322,
328-29(6th Cir. 1984).
In another case, however, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court reached the opposite result. Commonwealth v.
Stonehouse, 521 Pa. 41,57-58, 555A2d 772, 781 (1989)
(failure to introduceBWS evidence constituted ineffectivE
assistance of counsel).
A California appellate court concurred in a case where
defense counsel admitted that he had "never heard" of
such a defense, and BWS evidence would have helped
dispel "many of the commonly held misconceptions
about battered woman. As the record reflect[ed), the
prosecutor exploited several of these misconceptions in
urging the jUry to reject appellant's self-defense claim."
People v.Diiy, 2 Cal. App. 4th 405, 416, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d
916, 922 (1992).
Victim. Examinations
The courts are split on whether a defendant who
intends to introduce BWS evidence is required to submit
to an examination by prosecution experts.
In United States v. Vega-Penarete, 137 F. A.D. 233
(E. D. N.C. 1991), the court ruled that the prosecution
"should have the opportunity to respond to the defendant's expert testimony on the Battered Wife Syndrome
with testimony of its expert who has also examined the
defendant." /d. at 235. See a/so State v. Briand, 130 N.H.
650, 657-58, 547 A.2d 235, 240 (1988) (independent
evaluation required); State v. Myers, 239 N.J. Super. 158,
169-70, 570 A.2d 1260, 1266 (same), cert. denied, 127
N.J. 323,604 A.2d 598 (1990).
In Hickson v. State, 589 So. 2d 1366, 1369 (Fla. App.
1991), however, a Florida appellate court held that offering BWS evidence did not waive the Fifth Amendment
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privilege against self-incrimination, and thus an examination by a prosecution expert was impermissible.
The Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Hannum,
441 N.W.2d 793, 799-800 (Minn. 1989), resolved the issue
on different grounds. The court ruled that only generalized information about BWS is admissible, and thus a
defense expert is not permitted to express an opinion
about the particular defendant. This rule of limited
admissibility obviates the need tor an adverse examination by prosecution experts because defense experts will
not be allowed to testify based upon a defense examination of the defendant.
See generally Comment, "A Critique and Proposed
Solution to the Adverse Examination Problem Raised by
Battered Woman Syndrome Testimony in State v.
Hennum," 74 Minn. L. Rev. 1023 (1990).
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Right to Expert Assistance
Finally, an indigent defendant may have the right to
expert assistance in introducing BWS evidence. In Dunn
v. Roberts, 963 F.2d 308 (10th Cir. 1992), the 10th Circuit
ruled that the accused had such a right in support of a
duress defense.
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